| Challenges to Pakistan’s Nuclear Program and FMCT |
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Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) Islamabad held a seminar titled “Challenges to Pakistan’s Nuclear Program & FMCT” on January 19, 2012. The speakers included: Ambassador (r) Tariq Osman Hyder, Lt. Gen (r) Asad Durrani, former DG ISI and Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Associate Professor at Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Under the Chairmanship of Senator Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, the eminent speakers addressed this subject before a sizeable, well informed and representational audience which also participated through a question and answer segment.
The conclusions and recommendations of the seminars were as follows: 1.Pakistan’s nuclear program is a vital element of Pakistan’s national security. 10.Pakistan’s strategic nuclear program based on credible minimum nuclear deterrence is essential to maintain peace and security in this region. It is not aimed at any country and is purely defensive and to deter any aggression or adventurism. Minimum deterrence is not static, and without entering into an arms race, has to evolve to meet and to counter emerging threats to Pakistan’s security. 11.It is unfortunate that rather than discussing and partnering Pakistan’s long standing offer of a Strategic Restraint Regime (SSR) in South Asia based on nuclear restraint, conventional balance and dispute resolution, India has moved in the other direction in terms of it’s strategic capabilities, conventional build up and aggressive doctrines. 12.It is also unfortunate that many members of the international community rather than supporting strategic restraint in South Asia have bolstered India’s strategic and conventional capabilities and assets. The US-India nuclear deal and the exemption by the NSG without placing all of India’s power reactors, ambitious breeder reactors program and sizeable fissile material stocks from these power reactors under safeguards, is a clear violation of these countries NPT obligations. 13.The provision by Russia to India of nuclear submarines in the past, without any safeguards on their reactors, and now nuclear attack submarines capable of carrying nuclear armed ballistic missiles, constitute violations of Russia’s NPT obligations. Russian cooperation in the production of the Brahmos cruise missile is also a violation of Russia’s MTCR obligations. 14.Under the Indo-US nuclear deal, 8 Indian heavy water, natural uranium reactors, which are ideal for weapons grade Pu production have been left outside safeguards. Their joint capacity of 2,000 MW, running at 60% capacity, is adequate to produce 1,200 kg of weapons grade Pu which can produce 240 nuclear weapons annually. There is no precedent of keeping power reactors outside IAEA safeguards. 15.India’s ambitious breeder reactor program significantly and exponentially adds to its weapons grade Pu capability. As the objective of breeder reactors is to extend the use of fissile material for power production there is no justification for keeping this program outside of IAEA safeguards. 16.The Indian Prime Minister has stated in Parliament that no facet of India’s nuclear program which has a strategic significance would be placed under safeguards. This statement makes it clear that important aspects of India’s nuclear program kept out of safeguards have strategic objectives and therefore implications for the region and beyond. 17.The International Panel on Fissile Materials has stated inter alia in its 2010 publication, “Reducing and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament”, that, “India’s current stockpile of weapon grade plutonium is estimated as 700 kg by the IPFM, sufficient for about 140 fission weapons, and 6.8 tons of reactor-grade plutonium, sufficient for about 850 fission weapons”. 18.While not widely known, reactor grade Pu can be used for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a significant proportion of this unsafeguarded stockpile is likely to be weapons grade Pu, as predicted by an official American assessment made before 1974 when it stated that from the 2 reactors under construction India would be able to produce some 50-60 nuclear weapons. 19.The United States of America and the NSG should have made it a condition for any exemption for India that all its power and breeder reactors and its fissile material stockpile from its power reactors should be put under safeguards before the provision of any technology, additional nuclear power plants and uranium supplies. Equal treatment should have been given for Pakistan. An opportunity to introduce strategic restraint into South Asia was missed. Rather than professed non-proliferation objectives and NPT obligations, the motivation has been to build up India’s strategic capabilities, plus commercial considerations of profit. 20.Pakistan is therefore faced with: a grave asymmetry of fissile material stocks; an aggressive Indian “Pro-active” or “Cold Start” doctrine aimed at seizing Pakistani territory; development of an Indian nuclear Triad through the introduction of ballistic missile carrying submarines; the continued induction of other new lethal weapon systems; introduction of ABMs with cooperation from the USA, Russia and Israel; and a growing differential in terms of conventional armaments and capabilities facilitated by countries who call for better relations between Pakistan and India but whose actions on the ground are not in sync. 21.These developments have significant implications for Pakistan’s security. 22.The Seminar expressed full support for Pakistan’s position at multilateral disarmament fora, and for its principled position in the Conference on Disarmament which must be maintained. 23.In the CD Pakistan must continue to insist that:
24.Pakistan, a responsible nuclear State, supports the objectives of non-proliferation and should continue to contribute to the strengthening and further development of the international non-proliferation regime based on the principles of non-discrimination, equal and undiminished security for all states, and equal access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. |
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